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When I decided to write about edgework over twenty-five years ago, I had no idea that
I had put myself on a pathway of sustained engagement with one of the most important
sociologists of the twentieth century. As an academic sociologist in the early stages
of my career, I felt that I had a good general understanding of Erving Goffman’s most
important ideas and a proper appreciation of his unique contributions to my discipline.
Although I had a certain affinity for Goffman’s brand of sociology, I deliberately avoided
pressure from close friends and colleagues to become a “Goffmaniac,” the kind of
disciple that Goffman’s work often seems to inspire. However, when I took up the task
of formulating a theoretical explanation of volitional risk taking, I had no choice but to
dig more deeply into Goffman’s work, in particular, his famous essay entitled Where the
Action Is (1967), which at that time was one of the very few sociological theories of risktaking behavior. The most immediate result of this excavation was a better understanding
of the theoretical differences between my concept of edgework and Goffman’s notion
of action, but the long term consequence was a profound appreciation of the power and
relevance of Goffman’s ideas for making sense of the contemporary social world.
This appreciation of Goffman’s work has been enhanced in recent years by my emersion
in a body of theory and research that offers a unique perspective on the emerging social
conditions that account for the growing relevance of Goffman’s theory of action. The
work of Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and their collaborators on risk society and
reflexive modernization has given me a deeper understanding of the importance of risk
and uncertainty as central problems faced by members of twenty-first century global
society. Moreover, the risk society perspective has directly impacted my own research
by raising an intriguing question: In a world in which everyone is forced to contend
with new global risks and expanding uncertainties in everyday life, why do increasing
numbers of people seem to find pleasure and satisfaction in taking unnecessary risks?
In accordance with the organizing theme of the Special Issue, my paper addresses
this question by exploring potentially useful links between Goffman’s ideas on risk
and fatefulness and core ideas of the risk society perspective. I will argue that if we
live in a risk society and culture today—and I think we do—then Goffman’s theory of
action captures social processes that are critically important for ensuring the continued
reproduction of the social order, processes that are presently not theorized within the risk
society perspective.

Stephen Lyng
Professor
Department of Sociology
Carthage College
Email:

slyng@carthage.edu

In developing this argument, I will begin by identifying some key convergences
between Goffman’s dramaturgical perspective and general ideas on risk society and
reflexive modernization deriving from the distinctive theoretical programs advanced
by Ulrich Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991). These convergences create
the possibility of a conceptual integration of Goffman’s theory of action and major
elements of the risk society framework. Next, I explain how such an integration is
possible considering that Goffman’s theory of action (published in 1967) is oriented to
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social conditions prevailing in mid-twentieth century U.S. society while the risk society
perspective refers to globalized social relations of the twenty-first century. Here, I
will assert that the ontological issues that inspired Goffman’s theoretical reflections on
voluntary risk taking behavior (“action”) have become even more significant in recent
decades, which gives his theory of action greater purchase on contemporary social
conditions than the social circumstances of his own time. I then move to a discussion
of Scott Lash’s work on “risk culture” (2000) and “aesthetic reflexivity” (1993) to lay
the conceptual foundation for orienting Goffman’s ideas on action to the processes of
reflexive modernization described by Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994). Finally, I explain
how “action” and “character,” as Goffman conceived of these terms, are related to
important motivational and emotional resources involved in the reproduction of social
relations in world of expanding risk and uncertainty.
Beck, Giddens, and Goffman on Risk and Reflexivity
With the publication in the early 1990s of Ulrich Beck’s (1992) and Anthony Giddens’
(1990; 1991) works on the historical trajectory of the project of modernity, the intellectual
world was presented with a highly original stream of sociological theory that has
stimulated a large amount of debate and scholarship in the last twenty-five years. While
this body of work has raised many provocative issues for social and cultural inquiry,
it has been particularly effective in expanding awareness of the consequences we face
today living in a world of unprecedented global risks and increasing social and personal
uncertainties. The theoretical program that Beck and Giddens initiated is complex and
each theorist embraces different core assumptions and addresses a distinctive set of
concerns, so I will not attempt a comprehensive review of their respective approaches to
the study of risk and uncertainty here. At this point in the analysis, I will only highlight
the common general themes that emerge from their frameworks in order to demonstrate
how their ideas on late modernity and reflexive modernization overlap with Goffman’s
theoretical concerns and concepts. A more detailed discussion of certain key concepts
from Giddens’ theory of reflexive modernization will be presented later.
While the classical sociological theorists articulated the social, economic, and cultural
logics of the modern world in ways that established the conceptual foundations for the
discipline of sociology, many contemporary theorists have questioned the relevance of
the classical canon to social conditions unfolding in recent decades. Beck and Giddens
belong to this critical movement, but where some theorists see the curtain coming
down on modernity with the rise of the radically different social and cultural logics of
postmodernity, Beck and Giddens assert that the epic story of modernity has entered its
second act. This shift, driven by the processes of “reflexive modernization,” is marked by
the move from the industrial social order of the first modernity to the “world risk society”
of the second modern era (Beck 1999). Although the transition to second modernity is
associated with many institutional and existential changes highlighted by postmodern and
other historical/comparative perspectives, Beck and Giddens propose that most of these
changes are best contextualized in terms of the increasing significance of new global
risks, existential uncertainties, and reflexive social processes.
One distinctive characteristic of risks in the late modern era is the fact that they are
associated with a form of “systemic-reflexivity” involving a “recursive turning of
modernity upon itself” (Lynch 2000:28). As modern scientific rationality is put to
the task of controlling the dangers that have traditionally threaten human-kind (e.g.,
starvation, deprivation, natural disaster, attack from one’s enemies), new more complex
hazards are created that resist our efforts to control them (e.g., pesticides, overconsumption, the damming of rivers, nuclear weapons). One consequence of such
systemic-reflexivity is growing doubt about the value of science and industry as the lay
public has become increasingly aware of these new global risks. A growing suspicion
of science can be found among lay persons who must deal in very personal ways with
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the limitations and negative consequences of scientifically-based interventions into their
lives—e.g., the chemical contamination of their living environments, the iatrogenic
consequences of medical scientific treatments, and the increasingly contradictory and
ambiguous findings (especially those related to individual health and wellbeing) that
result from the accumulation of scientific knowledge.
A further effect of reflexive modernization is to detraditionalize the ways of living built
into industrial society (Beck, 1992:153). The detraditionalization process occurs on many
different levels and contributes to the decline of a wide range of social certainties within
first modern industrial society, including class conflict, the nuclear family, nation-state, the
standard gender roles of industrial society, and Fordist production. Thus, under conditions
of reflexive modernization, the established ontological and institutional boundaries
of industrial society begin to dissolve and the “either/or” logic of first modernity is
superseded by a new logic of “both/and” as people begin to manage boundaries in flexible
and pragmatic ways (Beck and Lau, 2005:527). In addition, individuals increasingly
reject pre-given, standard biographies and construct their own biographies by assuming
mutable and multiple subjectivities (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003:4). The result is “a social
structure in the process of becoming more fluid and individualized” as people look for
greater flexibility in how they organize family relations, friendship networks, working
hours, and couple relationships (Beck and Lau, 2005:530).
In documenting these dramatic alterations in the structural configurations of industrial
society and the conditions of daily living and personal experience, theorists of reflexive
modernization direct attention to the obvious fact that the social universe we occupy
today is more contingent and unpredictable than ever before. However, in addition to
reporting what many other commentators on contemporary social life have observed,
Beck and Giddens point out that the “confrontation with contingency” is not a unique
feature of our present way of life. Rather, it is the defining feature of the modern life in
general, from the 17th century to the present. Thus, in the transition from the pre-modern
to the modern social universe, the natural order of traditional societies gave way to a
natural contingency ordered by both the individual and the collective subject (Lash,
1993:5). Modernist social philosophers have expressed this basic theme in a variety of
ways: the chaos of “war of all against all” ordered by the collective subject in the form
of the state (Hobbes); the indeterminacy of existential reality ordered by the subject’s
universal cognitive categories (Kant); and the contingent plasticity of human beings
ordered by specific choices that the individual subject must make in every sphere of daily
life (Smith). Consequently, if dealing with contingency is the central imperative of the
modern life, then the critical issue in distinguishing one historical phase from another is
not the degree of contingency that exists in social relations, but the nature of individual
and collective responses to contingency. For Beck and Giddens, focusing on how subjects
respond to contingency is what allows us to fully grasp the importance of reflexivity in
the modernization process (captured by the term “reflexive modernization”) and to make
meaningful distinctions between early, late, and post modernity.
So what is the meaning of reflexivity in this framework? For Beck and Giddens,
reflexivity is best understood as involving various forms of “self-monitoring” (Giddens,
1990:36). However, the “self” in self-monitoring refers not just to individuals but
also to entire systems, which leads to a further specification of reflexivity in terms of
the distinction between individual and systemic reflexivity. The key point is that selfmonitoring at both the individual and systemic levels is oriented most fundamentally to
the problem of controlling contingency. Thus, in early (simple) modernity of industrial
society, the contingencies of life are controlled at the systemic level through various
expressions of the “insurance principle” (welfare state, social insurance, and private
insurance) and at the individual level by the “choices” people make—in relation to the
“opportunity costs” incurred for options not chosen—about such things such as one’s
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occupation, opposite-sex marital partner, family size, and friendship relations. By
contrast, in late (reflexive) modernity of the risk society, the insurance principle is no
longer sufficient for the type and magnitude of the risks that human populations face
(how do we insure against the harms of nuclear war?) and therefore reflexivity in the
late modern context becomes radicalized. Specifically, Beck sees self-monitoring
at the systemic level occurring in the form of new social movements devoted to the
rational critique of science from the perspectives of popularized knowledge, while
Giddens emphasizes self-monitoring mediated by expert systems in a reflexive process
he terms as the “double hermeneutic” (Giddens, 1987). At the individual level, this
involves the use of the therapeutic resources generated by the psychological sciences
and disseminated through the popularization of personal therapy, self-help manuals,
and the like. This form of reflexivity radicalizes individual choice: now, individuals not
only make choices about career paths or family size; they also choose particular selfidentities and construct biographies to match these chosen identities.
While there is much more to the risk society perspective than I can discuss here, the
preceding overview should be sufficient for the principal task of this section, which
is to demonstrate the conceptual convergences between Beck and Giddens’ ideas on
reflexive modernization and Goffman’s theorizing on risk and reflexivity. Where these
two theoretical perspectives converge most directly is in their respective understanding
of the “self” as an emergent of a reflexive process. As I have demonstrated, Giddens’
version of the reflexive self focuses on the double hermeneutic of individuals employing
expert knowledge (i.e., the psychological sciences) as a resource for constructing a
more desirable self, such that individual selves are ultimately mediated by professional
knowledge on the development and maintenance of the self. In contrast to Giddens’
phenomenological approach to the reflexive self, Goffman’s conception is firmly
rooted in the interactionist tradition. Following the lead of the American pragmatists,
especially George Herbert Mead’s ideas on the interactional foundation of meaning
and the self, Goffman conceives of the self as a reflexive emergent of interaction
between actor and audience. By asserting that the self does not exist apart from the
interaction of actor and audience, Goffman proposes a radically reflexive conception
of the self. If at a basic level reflexivity involves some form of mediation of everyday
experience (Lash, 1994:140), then Goffman calls attention to the way in which actors’
self-presentations are mediated by the responses of audiences to these dramatic
performances. Thus, Goffman’s notion of the reflexive self—subject making an object
of itself—is thoroughly interactional: in the context of face-to-face interaction, the
self-presentations of subjects are objectified in the responses of others, which then
recursively act back on the subjects who initiate these self-presentations. We see then
that the notion of the reflexive self is an important conceptual link between the theory of
reflexive modernization and Goffman’s dramaturgical model, although each perspective
emphasizes a different form of reflexivity, which I address below in terms of the
distinction between “cognitive” and “aesthetic” reflexivity.
If it is possible to connect Goffman’s work to the risk society perspective through
the concept of the reflexive self, a second important conceptual convergence can be
identified involving the previously mentioned “problem of contingency.” Goffman’s
concern with this issue is not as apparent in his scholarship as other theoretical issues
most often associated with his work, but it occupies a more important place in his
general framework than most sociologists realize. As followers of Goffman’s work
are well aware, the problems of unpredictability, uncertainty, and risk are addressed
most explicitly in his famous essay Where the Action Is (1967). Based on observations
deriving from his lifelong fascination with gambling and other forms of voluntary risk
taking, as well as a contested account of his involvement in a participant-observational
study of gambling as a Las Vegas casino dealer (see Shalin, this issue), Goffman
proposed a theoretical explanation of “action,” which he defined as behavior that
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is “problematic, consequential, and undertaken for what is felt to be its own sake”
(1967:185). Goffman’s way of accounting for the pursuit of action, with his sophisticated
treatment of the seemingly dubious connection between voluntary risk taking behavior
and morally-significant qualities that define a person’s “character,” is the part of his
analysis that has received the most attention from laypersons and scholars (c.f. Katz,
1988). However, there is another dimension of the theory of action that has not been as
widely acknowledged or understood as a crucial part of the explanation of voluntary risk
taking. In this part of the analysis, Goffman takes us out of the realm of actor-audience
interaction to engage with a problem that emerges at the systemic level. The structural
problem of concern to him here is a key issue for all modernist sociological theory, best
captured by posing the following question: “In the modern age of natural contingency,
how is the problem of social order solved?” Once again, what makes his answer to
this question particularly creative and powerful is his ability develop this apparently
incongruous proposition: Individuals who take unnecessary risks contribute important
resources for controlling contingency in the social world and therefore play an important
role reproducing the social order. As we will see below, this proposition is especially
relevant for understanding the social reproduction in the age of the risk society. In
order to develop this argument, however, we must first consider the contrast between
the social conditions of mid-twentieth century U.S. society—the societal referent of
Goffman’s theorizing about risk taking and contingency—and the social conditions of the
contemporary twenty-first century risk society.
Fatefulness and Risk Society
As noted above, Goffman’s most immediate goal in the essay Where the Action Is (WAI)
was to account for participation in “action”—behavior that is problematic, consequential,
and undertaken for what is felt to be its own sake. In addition to his celebrated ability
to capture the taken-for-granted nuances of human interaction and self-presentation,
Goffman’s theoretical work is noteworthy for the systematic approach he takes to
constructing his conceptual frameworks. So in WAI, we find him carefully building up
to his core concept of “action,” which is not discussed until the middle of this lengthy
essay, by engaging in a detailed exploration of each of the conceptual components of
action. He begins by examining the “problematic” dimension of action by devoting
several pages to the nature of chance-taking and gambles—reviewing well-established
concepts such as theoretical versus given odds, expected value, the concept of risk, etc.
Next, he adds complexity to our understanding of chance-taking by considering the
importance of “consequentiality” in individual decisions about gambles, which yields a
more sociologically-informed perspective on risk-taking. However, the most important
section of the first half of the essay, in terms of understanding Goffman’s sensitivity to
the “problem of contingency” and the social-historical specificity of his theory, is the
section dealing with “fatefulness.” Consequently, I will give more detailed attention to
his discussion of this concept.
In the simplest terms, the concept of “fatefulness” refers to a particular expression of
problematic and consequential activities. Any activity that is simultaneously highly
problematic (uncertain) and highly consequential (influencing objectively the later life
of the individual) can be termed as “fateful” (1967:164). Although Goffman’s primary
goal is to explain voluntary participation in fateful activities such as “practical gambles”
(risk taking for material gain) and “action” (risk taking for its own sake), he demonstrates
a keen awareness of the degree to which contingency and fatefulness are endemic to the
human condition. “Adventitious fatefulness” can be found in the unexpected twists and
turns of daily life deriving from the inherent uncertainties of living in complex natural
and social worlds. Fatefulness is also traceable to the basic vulnerability of the human
body which, as “a piece of consequential equipment,” is subject to many potential sources
of serious illness or injury (1967:167). However, the type of fatefulness that is most
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central to Goffman’s analysis involves the potentially consequential uncertainties that
one confronts in social situations of co-presence: “Just as the individual always brings
his (sic) body into every occasion of his activity …, so he brings himself as an upholder
of conduct standards like physical adeptness, honesty, alertness, piety, and neatness.
The record of an individual’s maintenance of these standards provides a basis others
use for imputing a personal make-up to him [and] they employ this characterization
in determining how to treat him—and this is consequential” (1967:167). Since social
situations offer opportunities for presenting favorable or unfavorable information about
oneself, they are intrinsically risky and are often a source of fatefulness. Thus, Goffman
is alert to the special challenge that every human being confronts in finding ways to
manage the multitude of contingencies associated with vulnerable bodies, emergent social
interactions, and existential uncertainties.
While Goffman’s reflections on these sorts of contingencies may be relevant to all
human societies, other parts of his discussion reveal the historical specificity of his
conception of fatefulness. In a particularly revealing passage (1967:161-164), he
employs the distinction between “time off” and “time on” to describe the true nature
of fatefulness. When individuals are free of institutionally determined responsibilities
associated with participation in paid employment, family life, and civic association (i.e.,
during “time off”), they have the luxury to “kill time” in activities of their own choosing.
Since the range of options for killing time are almost unlimited, time off periods are
usually problematic (characterized by uncertainty), but the choices made during these
times are not likely to be consequential. In contrast, the institutionally-determined
character of “time-on” activities involve the opposite combination of uncertainty and
consequentiality—they can be highly consequential but are rarely problematic, since the
routines of work, family life, and civic association leave little room for free choice in how
responsibilities are fulfilled. Goffman’s point in drawing this distinction is to highlight
the rare instances of truly fateful experience in the institutional realm—the combination
of uncertainty and consequentiality found only in the pursuit of “practical gambles” and
“action.”
So we find a certain bipolarity in Goffman’s analysis of fatefulness. On the one hand, he
demonstrates his concern with the natural contingency of human experience, especially
within the context of face-to-face interaction. As we will see, the problem of controlling
contingency in social situations becomes an explicit theme in his theory of action. On
the other hand, he also reveals his theoretical predisposition to the social order of midtwentieth century U.S. society with his claim that fatefulness is relatively rare in a
social system where institutional routines dominate in work, family life, and most other
social institutions. It is precisely this bipolarity in Goffman’s approach to fatefulness
that supports my claim that his theory of action has even greater relevance for the risk
society of the twenty-first century than it does for the social world of Goffman’s own
time. While fatefulness may not have been a characteristic of institutional activities in
Goffman’s time, we have seen that fatefulness pervades almost every institutional domain
of the contemporary social world—in the increasing uncertainties and insecurities in the
realm of work, in the dramatic changes in how families are constituted, in the expanding
choices available for performing gender roles and arranging intimate relationships, and
the other changes described in my earlier discussion of risk society. As I argue below, in
the context of a world where risk and uncertainty have become more prominent aspects
of social life than they were in Goffman’s time, his insights about the role of actionseeking in controlling contingency and reproducing the social order are more relevant
than ever. However, one more preliminary step is required before this argument can be
fully developed—we must consider a modification of the risk society approach that gives
greater attention to the cultural dimensions of risk and uncertainty.
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Risk Culture and Aesthetic Reflexivity
As an early contributor to the development of the reflexive modernization thesis, Scott
Lash (1993, 1994, 2000) has taken the risk society perspective in some promising new
directions. Lash’s response to the risk society model is informed by his engagement
with the cultural studies literature, which has shifted the sociological focus away from
traditional concerns with production and social class to “cultural” practices in the realms
of consumption, leisure, and media. Although Lash is generally sympathetic with Beck
and Giddens’ ideas on reflexive modernization, he complains that they fail to appreciate
the extent to which information and communication structures have displaced social
structures that have been receding under the influence of reflexive modernization (Lash,
1994:111). Thus, he boldly asserts that “the risk society that emerges from an industrial
society is in a relatively fast decline … [and it is] risk cultures which seem to be the
emergent present …” (Lash, 2000:60).
For Lash, the most important implication of this shift from risk society to risk culture
is that it forces us to reconsider the nature of contemporary reflexivity. In risk society,
the social structural conditioning of human action is increasingly mediated by social
scientific knowledge, which serves to liberate agency from its moorings in traditional
structural arrangements. Although this “structural reflexivity” occurs through the
mediation of conceptual symbols, Lash points out that the expansion of information and
communication structures has created another semiotic economy—“one of not conceptual
but mimetic symbols” (1994:135, emphasis mine). Cultural changes involving the
steady extension of electronic media into every aspect of personal life, with late modern
individuals devoting increasing amounts of time and attention to television, movies, radio,
Internet and “smart phone” communication, have created a new mode of reflexivity based
on mimetic symbols such as images, sounds, and narratives. The expanding influence of
mimetic symbols has created a space for a type of reflexivity that Lash terms as “aesthetic
reflexivity,” which he wishes to contrast with the “cognitive reflexivity” conceptualized
by Beck and Giddens. “If reflexivity is self-monitoring, then ‘aesthetic reflexivity’ would
be a sort of hermeneutic self-monitoring. … Aesthetic and hermeneutic reflexivity is
rooted not in self-monitoring but in self-interpretation” (Lash, 1993:8).
Lash’s treatment of risk culture and aesthetic reflexivity is complex and draws extensively
on a wide range of philosophical and theoretical traditions, so I will not attempt a
thorough review of his argument here. However, it would be helpful for the discussion
that follows to consider some of Lash’s salient points about risk culture and aesthetic
reflexivity. In seeking to correct the cognitive bias in Beck and Giddens’ conception of
reflexivity, Lash directs attention to the contrast between early modern and late modern
subjectivity. As noted above, the early modern imperative to order natural contingency
by the individual or collective subject is achieved through the subsumption of the
particular object by the universal subject, as exemplified by the cognitive reflexivity
of Kantian cognitive and practical judgement. In contrast, the expanding influence of
mimetic symbols in late modernity gives rise to subjective judgements that depend more
on hermeneutic interpretation by the subject, which means that the object can be only
partially subsumed by the subject. Since aesthetic judgement is rooted in imagination
and intuition, it involves a particularized component of subjectivity. Consequently, in
aesthetic reflexivity, the relationship between subject and object involves the subsumption
of a particular by a particular (Lash, 1993:9).
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Thus, the concept of aesthetic reflexivity denotes a radical form of subjectivity, in which
subjectivity escapes the universal of the cognitive categories and must find its own rules
(Lash, 2000:52). This is an open and bodily subjectivity where judgements “follow
not a visual logic but a logic much more tactile, sensuous, materialist and immediate;
they follow what might be called a ‘logic of sensation’”(Lash, 2000:57). Aestheticreflexive judgements connect everyday experience to supra-logical meanings attached to
existential experiences such as “the temporality of death, love, sexuality, relations with
one’s children, friendship” (Lash, 2000:53). In contrast to the cognitive and scientistic
orientation of the risk society model, the risk culture perspective views social life as
dominated by the concrete particulars of artifacts, rituals, and events that are affectively
charged.
Lash’s extensive writings on risk culture and aesthetic reflexivity provide a crucial link
between the risk society tradition and Goffman’s theory of voluntary risk-taking, but
the highly abstracted character of his discussion makes it difficult to directly connect
his idea of aesthetic reflexivity to Goffman’s conceptual framework. However, this
problem can be ameliorated by considering an empirical application of the concept of
aesthetic reflexivity to a domain that bears some strong resemblances to action-oriented
activities. Silvia Rief’s (2009) study of Club Cultures builds on Lash’s insights about
late modern reflexivity by broadening the focus of aestheticization to include not only
mimetic symbols but mimetic practices as well—in particular, mimetic practices in dance
(2009:93). It makes intuitive sense to establish parallels between dance and risk-taking
activities since they have many characteristics in common. Rief notes the similarities
between dance clubs and many other leisure settings that, coincidentally, happen to
show up in Goffman’s description of where action can be found: theme parks, shopping
malls, certain kinds of holidaying, urban spectacles, sport events, music festivals and
concerts, casinos or gambling halls—places that “emphasize the quest for excitement
… through absorbing sensual stimulation and the collective nature of the event, which
encourages expressivity and spontaneity” (2009:81). Thus, it is possible that dance (in
club environments) may be a useful metaphor for “action” in the sense of highlighting the
mimetic qualities of this form of risk taking behavior.
By combining mimetic symbols and mimetic practices in her conception of aesthetic
reflexivity, Rief is also able to focus attention on two critically important concerns of
Goffman’s general dramaturgical orientation. The first is the ontological priority that
is given to the interactional domain and the importance of co-presence in Goffman’s
dramaturgical approach. Rief states explicitly that her notion of aesthetic reflexivity
“draws attention to the role of implicit, embodied forms of understanding as well as to
mimetic practices, imagination and intuition that are essential to social interaction. In this
sense, aesthetic reflexivity can be seen as a key element of (face-to-face) interaction and
not only as an upshot of (post-) modernism or post-industrialism” (2009:97, emphasis
mine). She also notes that since club dancing takes place in a context of co-presence,
communication depends as much on collective dance and movement as it does on verbal
exchange—an interesting expression of Goffman’s famous distinction between signs
“given” versus signs “given off.” The coordination of practices within this domain of
interaction is rooted in “intuitive, embodied understanding, kinesthetic awareness and
empathy” (2009:93).
A second way that Rief’s conception of aesthetic reflexivity converges with the
dramaturgical approach is in the central significance assigned to the process of selfpresentation in this reflexive practice. As we have seen, the concept of reflexivity has
many meanings (see Lynch, 2000) and reflexive processes can operate at different levels
(e.g., systemic versus individual reflexivity) but, for Rief, the key relevance of club
dancing as a form of aesthetic reflexivity is its role in generating self-identity. Dance
clubs are “sites for cultural body and emotion work (Shilling, 2005) that forms a central
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part of identity at least in certain segments of the population. Such emotion work
involves the control of one’s body appearance and presentation through impression
management, the display or alteration of feelings …” (2009:82), and a self-presentation
that complies with aesthetic style codes (2009:93). A particularly strong link to
dramaturgy can be seen in Rief’s discussion of one of the two modes of “aestheticization”
involved in transcending everyday realities within club and dance cultures. “Stylization”
(in contrast to “sensation” involved in directly intervening in the nervous system through
drug use or other prosthetic technologies) is a performative, mimetic practice in which
individuals engage in a form of acting “as-if” by engaging in certain idealized ways
of comporting the body and performing social roles (2009:102). This is, of course,
reminiscent of Goffman’s early work on the “presentation of self,” which also emphasized
the idealized nature of the self displayed in performances before audiences (Goffman,
1959). Thus, in the context of club dancing, stylization can be understood as a special
form of acting:
From a mundane perspective, stylization embraces practices of decorating
or masquerading the body through fashion, dress, outfit, make-up, hairstyle,
costumes and more. This also extends to body action, the ‘decoration’ of
the body with gestures, postures, and movement as in dance, which has been
described as the creation of imaginary, ‘as-if’ spheres … (2009:102).
Rief’s study of club cultures clearly reveals the important overlaps between the mimetic
qualities of club dancing and processes of self-presentation captured by Goffman’s
dramaturgical perspective and therefore her work serves as an important bridge between
Lash’s abstract analysis of aesthetic reflexivity and the concept of action. Since
Goffman’s theory of action is based on background assumptions that derive from the
dramaturgical model of the self, it may be useful to conceptualize “action” as mimetic
practice that generates a form of aesthetic reflexivity. In the remaining section of this
paper, I explore this possibility and show how the theory of action helps broaden our
understanding of the problem of social reproduction in risk society and culture.
Ontological Insecurity, Aesthetic Reflexivity, and Action
So we return to the late modern social universe of risk society and culture. As discussed
earlier, the unique accomplishment of Beck and Giddens’ social-historical perspective is
that it allows us to see the contemporary global social system, dominated by humanlyproduced dangers of unprecedented scope and ever expanding uncertainties in daily life,
as a radicalized form of modernity as opposed to a post-modernity. This is an important
insight because it allows us to more effectively grasp the key imperative of our social
universe—the problem of dealing with natural contingency in human affairs, which
has existed since the inception of the modernist project several centuries ago. If it can
be understood that this fundamental imperative has not changed since the dawn of the
modern age, then it is possible to identify the most important distinguishing features
of the contemporary social world by describing and analyzing the social structures and
resources for controlling natural contingency. My goal at this point is to show how
Goffman’s theory of action contributes to this latter task.
I will begin by first identifying the particular version of the reflexive modernization
thesis that is most amenable to the present effort. As noted above, the common practice
of referencing both Beck and Giddens in discussions of reflexive modernization and
risk society tends to obscure important differences between these two theorists of late
modernity. Although they embrace a common vision of emergent social change, Beck
and Giddens belong to different paradigmatic sociological traditions. As Lash (1993:6-7)
points out, Beck belongs to the German “continuist” tradition (represented by Habermas
and Luhmann) that “understands social change as a learning process,” while Giddens is
tied to a “discontinuist” orientation closely aligned with the paradigmatic concerns of
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classical sociological theory. While Beck’s continuist orientation emphasizes change
and improvement, Giddens’ discontinuist agenda addresses the classical theoretical
question of “How is society possible?” Since Goffman’s theory of action is also primarily
concerned with the classical problem of order and social reproduction, I have chosen to
focus on Giddens’ version of reflexive modernization in explaining the role of action in
risk society and culture.
As an alternative to the dominating themes of institutional differentiation and integration
in mainstream sociological theory, Giddens’ approach to the development of modern
societies focuses on the way in which institutions become situated in time and space. In
particular, it is the emergence of time-space distanciation or the organization of time and
space “so as to connect presence and absence” that most distinguishes modern social
relations from the earlier pre-modern era (Giddens, 1990:14). The ultimate consequence
of time-space distanciation is that the “embedded” social world of the pre-modern era,
characterized by the co-presence of social actors, gives way to societies dominated
by “disembedded” institutions, in which social relations have been “lifted out” of the
local contexts of interaction and restructured across indefinite spans of time and space
(Giddens, 1990:21).
In addition to the effects of time-space distanciation and the disembedding of social
institutions, modern societies acquire a dynamic character that can also be traced to the
“reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations” deriving from the penetration of
social scientific ideas about social life into the broader culture of commonsense social
actors—the “double hermeneutic” process mentioned earlier. This involves the social
scientific cooptation and reformulation of lay agents’ ideas about social life and the
reintroduction of this social scientific meta-language back into the lay culture through
media- and education-base socialization. Thus, “[s]ociological knowledge spirals in and
out of the universe of social life, reconstructing both itself and that universe as an integral
part of that process” (Giddens, 1990:16, emphasis in original). As a consequence of
all three of these processes, the pace of change increases in the modern world, with
individuals experiencing expanding opportunities for escaping the constraints of local
habits and practices and modern organizations finding new ways to connect local and
global networks (Giddens, 1990:20). According to Giddens, these processes are the
driving forces behind the extreme dynamism of modernity.
By taking account of these “great dynamic forces of modernity,” Giddens is able to
distinguish the “radicalized” phase of modernity that is discontinuous with the early
phase of the modernist project (Giddens, 1990:52). However, the radical expression of
modernist principles that now frame the everyday experience of contemporary social
actors leaves most individuals in a highly unsettled state, which Giddens refers to
metaphorically as something like being aboard a “careering juggernaut” rather than a
well-driven automobile (Giddens, 1990:53). Riding the juggernaut of modernity has
many consequences for the moral and emotional lives of modern individuals, but one
of the most important of these moral/emotional concerns involves the emergence of a
distinctly modern preoccupation with the problem of “ontological security” (Giddens,
1990:92). Drawing heavily on the object-relations school of psychoanalytic thought,
Giddens conceptualizes ontological security as the basic sense of confidence that
individuals have in the constancy of the material and social world and the continuous
nature of the self. It refers to the fundamental sense of reliability we have in persons and
things, which is “an emotional, rather than a cognitive, phenomenon, and it is rooted in
the unconscious” (Giddens, 1990:92).
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Thus, in Giddens’ version of reflexive modernization, the key problem of explaining
order has been reformulated in terms of ontological security—or rather ontological
insecurity. “The problem is precisely how we can cope with … psychic and social
hazards, and maintain reasonable levels of order and stability in our personalities and
society” (Lash, 1994:117). In addressing this problem, Giddens returns again to his
roots in the phenomenological tradition, which is clearly revealed in the contrast he
draws between the pre-modern and modern social contexts. To explain how traditional
societies maintain social conventions in the face of ontological insecurity, he relies on
an ethnomethodological conception of ongoing “reality work” undertaken as a form of
hermeneutically mediated reflexivity. In traditional social environments dominated by
face-to-face interactions, the constancy of the material and social reality is a practical
accomplishment achieved through everyday talk and interaction. This reflexive process
sustains “an extremely sophisticated methodology of practical consciousness, which
is a continuing protective device … against the anxieties which even the most casual
encounter with others can potentially provoke” (Giddens, 1990:99). In the modern era,
by contrast, reality work is mediated more by institutions than face-to-face interaction and
the double hermeneutic becomes the primary means of managing ontological insecurity.
In this context, hermeneutically mediated reflexivity occurs through “expert systems,”
with the psychological sciences providing therapeutic resources that protect individual
identity against ontological insecurity and lay versions of the sociological perspective
maintaining trust in the social reproduction of social relations in the face of contingency
(Giddens, 1990:38-44).
Giddens’ version of reflexive modernization offers a powerful perspective on late modern
society that has strong purchase on the social world we inhabit today. However, like
any theory of comparable scope, Giddens’ framework is plagued by certain omissions
and contradictions. I believe that Lash (194:199) is correct in stating that Giddens’ (and
Beck’s) “analyses remain not so much flawed as partial because of a scientistic character
to their assumptions.” Giddens’ decision to frame the issues relating to ontological
insecurity in phenomenological/ ethnomethodological terms means that he can only
focus on cognitive forms of reflexivity in his analysis of the mediation of contingency,
even though he states himself that ontological security is “an emotional, rather than a
cognitive, phenomenon” (Giddens, 1990:92). So this raises some important questions:
Is the hermeneutically mediated reflexivity that Giddens emphasizes sufficient for
maintaining the constancy and continuity of material, social, and personal realities in the
face of ontological insecurity? If there is an emotional component to ontological security,
what kind of emotional resources are required to ensure that the contingencies of self and
social life are controlled and where can they be found? And if such emotional resources
are crucial for the ongoing (re)production of identities and social relations, how can these
resources be conceptualized in terms of reflexivity?
To answer these questions, I now return to Where the Action Is. Having previously
reviewed most of the ideas that form the conceptual scaffolding of Goffman’s theory of
action—the nature of risk, consequentiality, fatefulness, and the concept of action—I
will now get to the crux of his argument. Recall that the primary goal of the analysis is
to explain why individuals actively seek opportunities for risk taking when there is no
obvious gain for doing so. By claiming that action activities are “undertaken for what is
felt to be their own sake,” Goffman seems to suggest that action offers intrinsic rewards
that explain people’s attraction to the dangers of these undertakings. Deep into the
analysis, however, he reveals that he has chosen his words carefully in defining this aspect
of action, in order to avoid the implied meaning of this phrase. Action is undertaken for
what is felt to be its own sake—that is, action-seekers may feel a deep attraction to the
action experience, but this feeling hides the true significance of action.
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To explain what is really behind the pursuit of action, Goffman turns to the concept
of “character.” In Goffman’s usage, the term “character” refers to a range of personal
qualities displayed in fateful endeavors, which are crucial to maintaining one’s
involvement in the enterprise in the face of a strong desire to abandon the effort. To
get at the essential nature of character, Goffman distinguishes between the “primary
properties” or activity-specific skills one must possess in pursuing a particular form
of action (“timing” in bullfighting, a good “aim” in game hunting, knowledge of the
odds in gambling, etc.) and general qualities of character that apply to all forms of
action (1967:217). The most obvious expression of character in fateful events is the
demonstration of courage—the capacity to proceed with a dangerous course of action
even when one is fully aware of the dangers one confronts. But courage is most
often expressed in forms that are specific to the action undertaken, as when gamblers
gracefully submit to the rules of a game even when they have much to lose (the quality
of “gamble”) or when boxers demonstrate “gameness” or “heart” by continuing to give
their all to the fight in the face of almost certain defeat. The special power of Goffman’s
treatment of character, however, is his ability to identify the more subtle personal traits
exhibited in fateful situations that can influence the course of events. He employs terms
like “integrity,” “gallantry,” and “composure” to capture these qualities and he shows
how each of these traits is expressed in particular forms of action.
Among the collection of character traits that Goffman identifies, the one that receives the
most attention is composure, which is further dissected into the sub-capacities of poise,
emotional self-control, calmness, presence of mind, dignity, and stage confidence. What
is most noteworthy about the elements of composure, as compared to the other character
traits Goffman identifies, is that they all refer to somatic-affective qualities or embodied
capacities. In describing the general nature of composure, Goffman emphasizes the
control of one’s body in “physical tasks (typically involving small muscle control) in a
concerted, smooth, self-controlled fashion under fateful circumstances” (1967:222-23).
Similarly, he describes emotional self-control as exercising “physical control [over] the
organs employed in discourse and gesture” (1967:223). “Dignity” is explicitly defined
in corporeal terms as “sustain[ing] one’s bodily decorum in the face of costs, difficulties,
and imperative urges” (1967:225). Presence of mind is also considered as an embodied
skill, since it depends on the control of neurophysiological processes involved in mental
“blocking.” Mental calmness is an element of stage confidence, which is “the capacity
to withstand the dangers and opportunities of appearing before large audiences without
becoming abashed, embarrassed, self-conscious, or panicky” (1967:226). Thus, all
forms of composure are acquired through “the practiced easy use of human faculties—
mind, limbs, and, especially, small muscles” (1967:228).
Although one might suppose that properties of composure are simply the kinds of innate
embodied capacities that any courageous person possesses, this assumption would
violate the logic of Goffman’s analysis. The key to understanding the role of composure
and the other character traits in action activities is to appreciate the paradoxical nature of
character. Goffman challenges common-sense “folk-beliefs” about the innate quality of
character by proposing that it is not “given” in the individual but instead is “gambled.”
“[A] single good showing can be taken as representative and a bad showing cannot
be easily excused or re-attempted. To display or express character, weak or strong, is
to generate character. The self, in brief, can be voluntarily subjected to re-creation”
(1967:237).
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Thus, the paradox of character is found in the fact that it is both unchanging and
changeable:
And now we begin to see character for what it is. On the one hand, it refers to
what is essential and unchanging about the individual—what is characteristic
of him. On the other, it refers to attributes that can be generated and destroyed
during fateful moments. In this latter view the individual can act so as to
determine the traits that will thereafter be his; he can act so as to create and
establish what is to be imputed to him. Every time a moment occurs, its
participants will therefore find themselves with another little chance to make
something of themselves (1967:238).
This paragraph is a crucial one in Goffman’s essay because his assertions about character
and action here are clearly informed by his broader theorization of the self as an emergent
product of the interaction between actor and audience. In keeping with his dramaturgical
approach, Goffman orients us to “behavior materials [such as] the glances, gestures,
positionings, and verbal statements that people continuously feed into the situation,
whether intended or not” (1967:1). Thus, the self and its specific attributes are created
through a semiotic process that involves two parts: “a part that is relatively easy for the
individual to manipulate at will, being chiefly his verbal assertions, and a part with regard
to which he seems to have little control, being chiefly derived from expression he gives
off. The [audience] may then use what are considered to be ungovernable aspects of his
expressive behavior as a check upon the validity of what is conveyed by the governable
aspects” (Goffman, 1959:7, emphasis added). In other words, an individual who ‘signs’ a
self and its attributes to co-present others employs two basic semiotic resources—verbal/
linguistic expressions and somatic/affective indicators. The audience treats signs of the
latter variety as definitive because they are assumed to be impervious to manipulation by
the individual. Of course, Goffman rejects this common-sense belief and his theory of the
self rests on the claimed malleability of the body as a signing medium.
We see, then, why composure receives so much attention in Goffman’s discussion of
character. As the most embodied dimension of character, composure is viewed by
common-sense actors as the most reliable signifier of innately-based character. And yet,
all the elements of composure—poise, emotional self-control, calmness, presence of mind,
dignity, and stage confidence—are seen by Goffman as no less governable by individuals
engaged in character displays than the linguistic resources they may devote to this task.
The terms Goffman uses to describe how character is revealed in action highlight the
pliability of the semiotic resources employed for this purpose. Character is displayed,
shown, expressed, generated, created, and re-created. As these terms suggest, the
principal role of the body in volitional risk taking is to serve as a signing medium, one that
is essentially hyperconductive in nature (Shalin, 2007:217).
The primary importance of character is its significance for explaining why people engage
in dangerous action. In making the connection between action and character, Goffman
can explain the motives for risk taking in distinctively sociological terms. Challenging
the common-sense view of voluntary risk taking as motivated by individual-level factors,
Goffman suggests that action offers an opportunity for the reflexive formation of character.
The pursuit of action is when individuals can present self-qualities that indicate “what
they are made of.” In Goffman’s (1967:237) words, “[i]t is during moments of action
that the individual has the risk and opportunity of displaying to himself and sometimes
to others his style of conduct when the chips are down.” Thus, the acquisition and
maintenance of character is a reward of sufficient value to inspire the taking of serious
risks in dangerous action. “We can begin to see that action need not be perceived, in the
first instance, as an expression of impulsiveness or irrationality, even where risk without
apparent prize results. Loss, to be sure, is chanced through action; but a real gain of
character can occur” (1967:238).
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What we find in Goffman’s theory of action then is a creative elaboration of his
dramaturgical approach to individual-level reflexivity. As I stated earlier, Goffman’s
conception of individual reflexivity is rooted in an interactional framework (in contrast
to the phenomenological approach adopted by Giddens), which is revealed here in the
attention that he devotes to “strong character” as an imputed characteristic. Like his
more general notion of the self, the elements of character he identifies do not reside
within the individual; rather, they emerge out of the interaction of actor and audience.
Thus, in Goffman’s conception of individual reflexivity, the mediating factor is the
response of an audience to the behavioral displays of an action-seeker, which then
become integrated into the self-concept of the action-seeking individual. The process of
observers imputing strong character to action-seekers is fully reflexive in the sense that
the imputation has practical consequences for action seekers—as an audience-produced
indexical expression of the traits exhibited by action-seekers, strong character “changes
the very practical circumstances for which it now stands as a description” (Mehan
and Wood, 1975:141). In other words, the character of the action-seeking subject is
objectified through the responses of others to his or her behavioral displays.
For the broader purposes of this analysis, the key thing to note about Goffman’s
approach to action and character is that it refers to a form of reflexivity that involves
behavior, embodiment, and emotion. As we have seen, being designated as a person
of strong character is not dependent upon anything that action-seekers say about
themselves; rather, it depends on how one actually acts in fateful situations, on the
comportment of one’s body, on the management of one’s emotions in these situations.
Like the club dancing activities studied by Rief, the pursuit of action is about movement,
sensual involvement with people or things, emotional stimulation and control, deep
connections to body equipment or gear, affectively-charged rituals and events, and the
use of one’s intuition and imagination. In action, as in dance, the mediation of the self
occurs not through linguistic symbols but through mimetic practices. Thus, the reflexive
process that Goffman describes in his theory of action is best classified as a form of
aesthetic reflexivity: the displays of movement, body comportment, and emotion by
action-seekers represent a form of mimesis, in which the moral/ethical constitution of
these individuals (as persons of “strong character”) are “mirrored” in the responses of
the audience.
The focus on (re)creation of the self in character displays is more typical of Goffman’s
approach as it is known to most sociologists, although the connection established here
between Goffman’s notion of reflexivity and mimetic/aesthetic practices is something
new. What is generally overlooked in Goffman’s study of action, however, is his
shift from the more familiar focus on individual reflexivity to an analysis of systemic
reflexivity. In fact, the connection he establishes between individual and systemic
reflexivity is the lynchpin of his entire theory of volitional risk taking. After discussing
the reflexive generation of character in the interactions of action-seekers and their
audiences, he moves to another level of analysis to explain the broader social value of
character (and the action activities in which it is displayed):
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Social organization everywhere has the problem of morale and continuity.
Individuals must come to all their little situations with some enthusiasm and
concern, for it is largely through such moments that social life occurs, and if
a fresh effort were not put into each of them, society would surely suffer. …
[I]f society is to persist, the same pattern must be sustained from one actual
social occasion to the next. Here the need is for rules and conventionality. …
Possibilities regarding character encourage us to renew our efforts at every
moment of society’s activity we approach, especially its social ones; and it is
precisely through these renewals that the old routines can be sustained. We are
allowed to think there is something to be won in the moments we face so that
society can face moments and defeat them (1967:238-239).
Thus, action offers an opportunity to reward strong character, but what is most important
about these personal traits is that they ensure people’s willingness to “renew [their]
efforts at every moment of society’s activity.” In short, action-seekers model the
qualities that all societal members must exhibit to some degree if the existing social order
is to persist. Goffman’s keen sense of irony in social life is displayed in his observations
about where these action-seeking “figures-for-identification” are typically found in the
social order:
And so, on the edges of society, are puddles of people who apparently find
it reasonable to engage directly in the chancy deeds of an honorable life. In
removing themselves further and further from the substance of our society, they
seem to grasp more and more of certain aspects of its spirit. Their alienation
from our reality frees them to be subtly induced into realizing our moral
fantasies (1967:267).
We see now that Goffman’s theoretical agenda in his study of action is much broader and
sophisticated that most interpreters of his work realize. While it is true that the theory of
action represents an especially creative application of the dramaturgical perspective and
exploration of the reflexive self, it is also clear that Goffman’s concerns extend beyond
issues relating to actor-audience interaction to the one of central paradigmatic problems
addressed by social theorists since the inception of our discipline (and before). This is
the problem of explaining “how societies persist” in the face of the natural contingencies
and ontological insecurities of lived experience in the modern world. In Goffman’s own
terms, it is the problem of explaining how social actors can be motivated to approach
their “little situations” with enthusiasm and concern; to put “fresh effort” into sustaining
“old routines.” What is most remarkable about Goffman’s theory of action is his novel
response to this problem and the continuing relevance of his ideas to the late modern
social world we inhabit today. I will conclude with some brief observations on this last
point.
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Conclusions
Following Beck, Giddens, and Lash, it can be asserted that the central imperative of risk
society and culture is the problem of controlling contingency, which unifies all of the
historical configurations of “modern” life. I have reviewed the various ways that these
theorists treat the problem of natural contingency, with a particular focus on Giddens’
account of reflexive modernization and Lash’s response to this account. As we have
seen, Giddens frames the problem of contingency in terms of the late modern condition
of ontological insecurity and focuses on how individuals continue to do their part in
reproducing the social order in the face of such insecurity. In addressing this problem,
he emphasizes hermeneutically mediated reflexivity, in the form of the ethnomethods of
practical conscious in the pre-modern context and the knowledge technologies of expert
systems in the late modern context. Thus, as Lash points out, Giddens sees the problem
of contingency being solved through the mediation of cognitive symbols, which means
that reflexive modernization is achieve primarily through cognitive reflexivity.
While I agree with the general thrust of Giddens’ analysis, I have tried to show that an
engagement with Goffman’s theory of action sensitizes us to a missing dimension in
Giddens’ approach. Giddens demonstrates the necessity of “reality work” to ensure the
reproduction of the social order and he explains how such reality work is performed
in late modernity, but he fails to fully address the need for “emotion work” in social
reproduction. Clearly, the persistence of social life depends upon the ongoing generation
of motivational and emotional resources that inspire social actors to put “fresh effort”
into sustaining the many social situations they must navigate in daily life. In a social
environment characterized by the steady decline of normative constraints and increasing
dominance of risk agency and consciousness, this kind of emotion work has become
more important than ever before.
Where Giddens’ theory of reflexive modernization connects with Goffman’s theory
of action, then, is in their different but complementary conceptions of reflexivity: for
Giddens, reflexivity is a hermeneutic/cognitive form, in which hermeneutically mediated
reflexivity is achieved via talk or the internalization by laypersons of expert knowledge;
for Goffman, reflexivity is a mimetic/aesthetic form, which involves self-performance
via mimetic actions and corporeal signs. To establish an even stronger complementarity
between Giddens’ and Goffman’s approaches to reflexivity, it is also useful to consider
Goffman’s treatment of “vicarious experience,” which is taken up at the end of his essay.
Anticipating the expanding importance of cultural structures in late modernity, especially
the products controlled by the culture industry, Goffman briefly discusses mass media
depictions of “serious” action: In film, television, books, magazines, etc. “opportunity
is provided us to identify with real or fictive persons engaging in fatefulness of various
kinds, to participate vicariously in these situations” (1967:262). In the late modern
social world, “action-figures” manufactured by mass media are perhaps our most readily
available sources of identification with individuals of strong character. Thus, if expert
systems provide important cognitive resources for managing ontological insecurity in
late modernity, media images and narratives may function as powerful motivational and
emotional resources for dealing with this problem.
Whether real or mediatized—a distinction that is becoming increasingly tenuous in late
modernity—action seekers can be understood here as contributing to an aesthetic form
of reflexivity that, along with cognitive reflexivity, ensures the continued reproduction
of social reality. In an age of unprecedented global risks and expanding uncertainties
in social relations, we confront one of the great ironies of late modern existence: as life
becomes more risky and uncertain for increasing numbers of people, individuals who
take unnecessary risks become primary sources of moral inspiration for us all.
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